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Abstract — This paper presents a new steganographic method 
called WiPad (Wireless Padding). It is based on the insertion of 
hidden data into the padding of frames at the physical layer of 
WLANs (Wireless Local Area Networks). A performance 
analysis based on a Markov model, previously introduced and 
validated by the authors in [10], is provided for  the method in 
relation to the IEEE 802.11 a/g standards . Its results prove 
that maximum steganographic bandwidth for WiPad is as high 
as 1.1 Mbit/s for data frames and 0.44 Mbit/s for 
acknowledgment (ACK) frames. To the authors’ best 
knowledge this is the most capacious of all the known 
steganographic network channels. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we present and evaluate a new information hiding 
method based on bit padding of OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency 
Division Multiplexing) symbols at the physical layer (PHY) of 
IEEE 802.11 networks. Depending on the transmission data rate at 
the PHY layer the number of encoded bits per symbol spans from 
24 up to 216, therefore as many as  27 octets can be embedded in 
each OFDM symbol. Due to the specific  structure of a frame 
(described in detail in Section III) up to 210 bits per frame (26 ¼ 
octets/frame) can be allocated for hidden communication. We 
named this steganographic method utilizing the principle of frame 
padding in the physical layer of WLANs with the acronym WiPad 
(Wireless Padding). 
This paper provides an evaluation of througput for this method 
with the aid of our general, Markov-based model introduced and 
validated in [10]. This model  is in line with the extensions of 
Bianchi’s basic model [2] proposed in [10] and [9]. The essential 
difference with respect to the latter two is the consideration of the  
effect of freezing of the stations’ backoff timer, as well as the 
limitation of the number of retransmissions and the maximum size 
of the contention window, and the impact of transmission errors. 
Results presented in [10] proved good accuracy of our model in the 
case of both: error-free and error-prone channels. In either case the 
proposed model is more accurate than other models presented in 
literature with which it was compared (including: [1], [9] and 
[10]), most notably, when large numbers of stations are under 
consideration.  
This paper is organized as follows. Next section provides an 
overview of the state of the art with regard to information hiding 
techniques that utilize padding in WLANs. Section III contains a 
description of our method. Section IV is a brief overview of the 
model presented in [10] and introduces a performance metric for the 
proposed method. Section V presents a performance analysis of the 
method based on the given model. Finally, Section VI contains 
conclusions and suggestions for future work. 
II. STATE OF THE ART 
Data padding can be found at any layer of the OSI RM, but it is 
typically exploited for covert communications only in the data link, 
network and transport layers. Wolf proposed in [13] a 
steganographic method utilizing padding of 802.3 frames. Its 
achievable steganographic capacity was maximally 45 bytes/frame. 
Fisk et al. [2] presented padding of the IP and TCP headers in the 
context of active wardens. Each of these fields offers up to 31 
bits/packet for covert communication. Jankowski et al. in [4] 
developed a steganographic system, PadSteg, which bases on 
Ethernet frames’ padding and is used in conjunction with ARP 
(Address Resolution Protocol) and TCP (Transmission Control 
Protocol) protocols. Padding of IPv6 packets as means for 
information hiding was described by Lucena et al. in [8]  - it offers 
a couple of channels with a steganographic bandwidth reaching 256 
bytes/packet.   
Steganography for IEEE 802.11 was proposed by Szczypiorski 
in [12], who postulated usage of frames with intentionally corrupted 
checksums to establish covert communication. The system was 
evaluated by Szczypiorski in [11]. Krätzer et al. in [6] developed a 
storage channel based scenario (employing header embedding) and 
a time channel based scenario for IEEE 802.11. In [7] Krätzer et al.  
reconsidered the approach presented in [6]. 
III. THE METHOD 
IEEE 802.11 a/g standards exploit OFDM at the physical layer. 
802.11 network’s PHY layer consists of two sublayers: PLCP 
(PHY Layer Convergance Procedure) and PHY Medium-
Dependent (PMD). Selection of a specific transmission data rate at 
the PHY layer implies functioning with a predefined number of 
bits corresponding to each OFDM symbol. The number of bits per 
symbol may  vary from 24, for 6 Mbps, up to 216, for 54 Mbps 
(Table I). Three fields are liable to padding: SERVICE, PSDU 
(Physical layer Service Data Unit), TAIL (Fig. 1). The lengths of 
SERVICE and TAIL are constant (16 bits and 6 bits respectively), 
while the PSDU is a MAC frame and its length varies depending 
on user data, ciphers and network operation mode (ad hoc vs. 
infrastructure).  
TABLE I PARAMETERS OF 802.11 A/G OFDM PHY 
Rate R  
[Mbit/s] 
Modulation  Code 
rate 
Number of 
bits per 
symbol – NBpS 
Factorization 
of NBpS into 
primes 
6 BPSK ½ 24 233 
9 BPSK ¾ 36 2232 
12 QPSK ½ 48 243 
18 QPSK ¾ 72 2332 
24 16-QAM ½ 96 243 
36 16-QAM ¾ 144 2432 
48 64-QAM  192 263 
54 64-QAM ¾ 216 2333 
 
For each rate R, the number of bits per symbol can be 
factorized into primes (Table I) and then, using this knowledge, a 
least common multiple can be calculated as . This 
means that the maximum number of padding bytes (octets) that 
may be used for all rates is: 
 (1) 
where α is a positive integer. 
Please note that padding is present in all frames, therefore 
frames that are more frequently exchanged, like  ACKs may 
become an interesting target for covert communication.  
Typically all padding bits are set to zero [3], but in this paper 
we assueme that all of them could be used for steganographic 
purposes. 
 
Fig. 1. The structure of 802.11a/g PPDU  for ERP-OFDM networks 
IV. THE MODEL 
A.  Assumptions 
We considered saturation conditions: stations have non empty 
queues and there is always a frame to be sent. The number of 
stations competing for medium access is n (for n=1 there is one 
station sending frames to another station which may only reply 
with an ACK frame). Errors in the transmission medium are fully 
randomly distributed; this is the worst case scenario in terms of 
frame error rate – FER. All stations experience the same bit error 
rate (BER) and all are within each other’s transmission range and 
there are no hidden terminals. Stations communicate in ad hoc 
mode (BSS – Basic Service Set) with basic access method. Every 
station employs the same physical layer (PHY). The transmission 
data rate R is the same and constant for all stations. All frames are 
of constant length L. The only frames that are exchanged are data 
frames and ACK frames. Collided frames are discarded – the 
capture effect [5] is not considered. 
 
B.  Saturation throughput S expressed through 
characteristics of the physical channel  
 
The saturation throughput S is defined as in [1]: 
 
 
(2) 
where E[DATA] is the mean value of successfully transmitted 
payload, and E[T] is the mean value of the duration of the 
following channel states: 
TI – idle slot, 
TS – successful transmission, 
TC – transmission with collision, 
TE_DATA – unsuccessful transmission with data frame error, 
TE_ACK – unsuccessful transmission with ACK error. 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates dependence of the above channel states on:  
TPHYhdr – duration of a PLCP (PHY Layer Convergence 
Procedure) preamble and a PLCP header, 
TDATA – data frame transmission time, 
TACK – ACK frame duration, 
TSIFS – duration of SIFS (Short InterFrame Space), 
TDIFS – duration of DIFS (DCF InterFrame Space), 
TEIFS – duration of EIFS (Extended InterFrame Space). 
 
The relation of the saturation throughput to physical channel 
characteristics is calculated similarly as in [9]: 
 
(3) 
 
where σ is the duration of an idle slot (aSlotTime [3]) and δ is the 
propagation delay. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Channel states 
 
For 802.11a/g OFDM  PHY (Fig. 1): 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
where: 
Tsymbol – duration of a transmission symbol, 
LSER – OFDM PHY layer SERVICE field size, 
LTAIL – OFDM PHY layer TAIL field size, 
NBpS – number of encoded bits per symbol, 
LACK – size of an ACK frame, 
LDATA – size of a data frame. 
 
Values of σ, TPHYhdr ,TSIFS, TDIFS, TEIFS, Tsymbol, NBpS, LSER and 
LTAIL are defined in accordance with the 802.11 standard ([3]). 
Probabilities corresponding to the states of the channel are 
denoted as follows: 
PI – probability of an idle slot, 
PS – probability of successful transmission, 
PC – probability of collision, 
PE_DATA – probability of unsuccessful transmission due to 
data frame error, 
PE_ACK – probability of unsuccessful transmission due to 
ACK error. 
 
Let τ be the probability of frame transmission, pe_data the 
probability of data frame error and pe_ACK the probability of an 
ACK error. These are related to channel state probabilities as 
follows: 
 
(6) 
 
The saturation throughput S equals: 
 
(7) 
 
where Lpld is MAC (Medium Access Control) payload size and Lpld 
= L – LMAChdr, where LMAChdr is the size of the MAC header plus the 
size of a FCS (Frame Checksum Sequence).  
The data rate R is defined as: 
 
(8) 
As a result, saturation throughput S is expressed as a function 
of τ, pe_data and pe_ACK. In the following sections these probabilities 
are evaluated. 
 
C. Probability of frame transmission τ 
Let s(t) be a random variable describing DCF backoff stage at 
time t, with values from set {0, 1, 2,…,m}. Let b(t) be a random 
variable describing the value of the backoff timer at time t, with 
values from the set {0, 1, 2,…, Wi-1}. These random variables are 
correlated because the maximum value of the backoff timer 
depends on the backoff stage: 
 
(9) 
 
where W0 is the initial size of the contention window (CW) and m’ 
is (the boundary stage above which the contention widow will not 
be enlarged further) ; m’ can be either greater, smaller or m. W0 
and Wm’ depend on CWmin and CWmax [3]:  
 
 (10) 
 (11) 
 
The two-dimensional process (s(t), b(t)) will be analyzed with 
the aid of an embedded Markov chain (steady state probabilities), 
whose states correspond to the time instants at which the channel 
state changes. Let (i,k) denote the current state of this process. The 
conditional, one-step, state transition probabilities will be denoted 
by .  
Let pf be the probability of transmission failure and pcoll the 
probability of collision. The non-null transition probabilities are 
determined as follows: 
 
(12) 
 
Ad (a): The station’s backoff timer is decremented from k+1 to 
k at a fixed, i-th backoff stage, i.e. the station has detected an idle 
slot. The probability of this event Pr{channel is idle} = 1 – Pr{one 
or more stations are transmitting}. We consider saturation 
conditions, so Pr{one or more stations are transmitting} equals 
pcoll. 
Ad (b): The station’s backoff timer is frozen at a fixed, i-th 
backoff stage, i.e. the channel is busy. Pr{channel is busy} = 
Pr{one or more stations are transmitting} = pcoll.  
Ad (c): The station’s backoff timer is changed from 0 to k and 
the backoff stage reinitialized from i to 0. The probability of this 
event equals: Pr{transmission is successful and number k was 
randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage 0} = 
Pr{transmission is successful} ⋅ Pr{number k was randomly chosen 
to initiate the backoff timer at stage 0}. The probability of 
successful transmission is equal to 1 – pf and the probability that 
number k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at 
stage 0 equals 1/W0. 
Ad (d): The station’s backoff timer is changed from 0 to k and 
the backoff stage is increased from i-1 to i. Probability of this 
event equals: Pr{transmission is unsuccessful and number k was 
randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage i} = 
Pr{transmission is unsuccessful} ⋅ Pr{number k was randomly 
chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage i}. The probability of 
unsuccessful transmission equals pf and the probability that number 
k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage i 
equals 1/Wi. 
Ad (e): The station’s backoff timer is changed from 0 to k and 
the backoff stage is changed from m to 0, i.e. the station has 
reached the maximum retransmission count. The probability of this 
event equals the probability that number k was randomly chosen to 
initiate the backoff timer at stage 0, i.e. 1/W0. 
Let bi,k be the steady-state occupancy probability of state (i,k). 
It can be shown that: 
 (13) 
 (14) 
and 
 
(15) 
From the normalization condition: 
 
(16) 
and 
 
(17) 
we get: 
 
(18) 
where  
(19) 
The probability of frame transmission τ is equal to Pr{backoff 
timer equals 0} and thus: 
For pcoll = 0 the above solution is the same as presented in [9].  
 
D. Probability of transmission failure pf  and probability of collision pcoll 
 
The probability of transmission failure 
 (21) 
 
where pe is the frame error probability:  (22) 
 
where pe_data is FER for data frames and pe_ACK is FER for ACK 
frames. pe_data and pe_ACK can be calculated from bit error 
probability (i.e. BER), pb:  
 (23) 
 (24) 
 
The probability of collision:  
 (25) 
Finally 
 (26) 
 
Equations (20) and (26) form a non-linear system with two 
unknown variables τ and pf which can be solved numerically.  
E. Capacity and saturation throughput of 
steganographic channels 
Let the capacity of a steganographic channel based on data 
frames be:  
 
(27) 
Let the capacity of a steganographic channel based on ACK 
frames be: 
 
(28) 
Therefore the saturation throughput of a steganographic 
channel based on data frames may be defined as: 
 
(29) 
And, finally, the saturation throughput of a steganographic channel 
based on ACK frames equals: 
 
(30) 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Frames with a maximum number of padding 
octets 
All diagrams presented in this section display values of the 
saturation throughput of the proposed steganographic method 
(WiPad) based on the data frame variant. All calculations were 
made for n∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. For L=214 octet frames 
(α=1; 186 bytes at IP layer) the following values of BER were used 
{10-4, 10-5, 0}, and for L∈{214, 430, 646, 862, 1078, 1294, 1510} 
octet frames (α∈{1, 2,…, 7}) the correspondent BER∈{10-4, 10-5, 
0}. We considered the IEEE 802.11g – ERP-OFDM i.e. "g"-only 
mode and a data rate of R=54 Mbps (with an exception for the last 
diagram, which provides an evaluation of the impact of R on SDATA). 
Fig. 3 presents SDATA as a function of n for L=214 octet frames 
and different values of BER. Along with an increasing value of 
BER the steganographic throughput, SDATA, declines. The maximum 
value reaches 1.12 Mbps for BER=0 and n=1. Along with an 
increasing value of BER the presented curves flatten out. For a 
given BER, the decrease of SDATA together with an increase of n is 
related to a growing number of collisions in the medium. The 
observed decline in the value of  SDATA between BER=0 and 
BER=10-5 is very small.  
Fig. 4 presents SDATA as a function of n for different values of 
frame length and BER=0. For a given n, an increasing frame length 
leads to a fall in the attainable SDATA. 
Fig. 5 represents the correlation between SDATA and  n, for 
different values of frame length and BER=10-5, while Fig. 6 
displays SDATA as a function of n for different frame lengths and 
BER=10-4. Compared to the values obtained for BER=0, we observe 
a reduction in the value of SDATA due to the influence of channel 
errors. 
 
Fig. 3. SDATA as a function of n – for L=214 octets and different values of 
BER 
 
 
(20) 
 
Fig. 4. SDATA as a function of n – for different values of frame length and 
BER=0 
 
Fig. 5. SDATA as a function of n – for different values of frame length and 
BER=10-5 
Fig. 6. SDATA as a function of n – for different values of frame length and 
BER=10-4 
Finally we evaluate (Fig. 7) SDATA as a function of n for 
different IEEE 802.11g data rates R∈{6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 54} 
Mbps. 
 
Fig. 7. SDATA as a function of n – for L=214 octets, BER=0 and different 
values of R 
B. ACK frames 
 
Fig. 8. SACK  as a function of n – for L=214 octets, BER=0 and different 
values of R 
We evaluate (Fig. 8) SACK as a function of n for different 
IEEE 802.11g data rates R∈{18, 24, 36, 48, 54} Mbps. For n=1 and 
R=54, SACK=0.44 Mbps (82 bits serve as a hidden channel). The 
throughput for 24 Mbps networks is higher than for 36 Mbps 
because of the different capacity of the hidden channel: 58 and 10 
bits respectively. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we evaluated a new steganographic method called 
WiPad intended for IEEE 802.11 OFDM networks, whose 
functioning bases on insertion of bits into the padding of 
transmission symbols. The analysis for IEEE 802.11g 54 Mbps 
networks revealed that the capacity of WiPad equals 1.1 Mbit/s for 
data frames and 0.44 Mbit/s for ACK frames, which gives a total of 
almost 1.65 Mbit/s. To the authors’ best knowledge this is the most 
capacious of all the known steganographic network channels. 
Future work will include WiPad analysis for typical IP packet 
sizes and the estimation of achievable steganographic bandwidth in 
case of the IEEE 802.11n standard. Further studies should also 
involve pinpointing potential detection mechanisms of the proposed 
communication system. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Bianchi, G.: Performance Analysis of the IEEE 802.11 Distributed 
Coordination Function. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in 
Communications, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2000) 535-547 
[2] Fisk, G., Fisk, M., Papadopoulos, C., Neil, J.: Eliminating 
Steganography in Internet Traffic with Active Wardens, In Proc: 5th 
International Workshop on Information Hiding, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science: 2578, 2002, str. 18–35 
[3] IEEE 802.11, 2007 Edition, IEEE Standard for Information 
Technology – Telecommunications and Information Exchange 
between Systems – Local and Metropolitan Area Network – Specific 
Requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control 
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications (2007) 
[4] Jankowski, B., Mazurczyk, W., Szczypiorski, K.: Information Hiding 
Using Improper Frame Padding,  Submitted to 14th International 
Telecommunications Network Strategy and Planning Symposium 
(Networks 2010), 27-30.09.2010, Warsaw, Poland 
[5] Kochut, A., Vasan, A., Shankar, A., Agrawala, A.: Sniffing Out the 
Correct Physical Layer Capture Model in 802.11b. In: 12th IEEE 
International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP 2004), Berlin 
(2004) 
[6] Krätzer, C., Dittmann, J., Lang, A., Kühne, T.: WLAN 
Steganography: a First Practical Review. In Proc. of: 8th ACM 
Multimedia and Security Workshop. Geneve (Switzerland), 26-27 
September 2006 
[7] Krätzer, C., Dittmann, J., Merkel, R.: WLAN steganography 
revisited. In: Proc: of SPIE Electronic Imaging 2008, San Jose, CA, 
2008 
[8] Lucena N. B., Lewandowski G., Chapin S. J.: Covert Channels in 
IPv6, Proc. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET), May 2005, pp. 
147–66. 
[9] Ni, Q., Li, T., Turletti, T., Xiao, Y.: Saturation Throughput Analysis 
of Error-Prone 802.11 Wireless Networks. Wiley Journal of Wireless 
Communications and Mobile Computing (JWCMC), Vol. 5, Issue 8 
(2005) 945-956 
[10] Szczypiorski, K., Lubacz, J.: Performance Evaluation of IEEE 802.11 
DCF Networks. In: 20th International Teleraffic Congress (ITC-20), 
Ottawa, Canada, June 17-21, 2007; Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science (LNCS) 4516, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (2007) 
1082-1093 
[11] Szczypiorski, K.: A Performance Analysis of HICCUPS - a 
Steganographic System for WLAN. In Proc. of: 2009 International 
Conference on Multimedia Information NEtworking and Security 
(MINES 2009) - First International Workshop on Network 
Steganography (IWNS'09), Wuhan, Hubei, China, 18-20 November, 
2009, Vol. I, pp. 569-572 
[12] Szczypiorski, K.: HICCUPS: Hidden Communication System for 
Coruppted Networks. In Proc: The Tenth International Multi- 
Conference on Advanced Computer Systems ACS'2003. 
Miedzyzdroje. 22-24 October 2004. pp. 31-40 
[13] Wolf M: Covert Channels in LAN Protocols, Proc. Wksp. Local Area 
Network Security (LANSEC), 1989, pp. 91–101. 
[14] Wu, H., Peng, Y., Long, K., Cheng, S., Ma, J.: Performance of 
Reliable Transport Protocol over IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN: 
Analysis and Enhancement. In: IEEE INFOCOM`02 (2002) 
 
 
 
